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Abstract 
This project studies the potential benefit of corporate governance structures within a 
provincial government milieu. Provincial government has historically followed traditional 
constitutional governance structures to optimize its services to the public. It is posited that 
corporate governance structures are analogous to those of government with the member of the 
public being analogous to the shareholder in a corporate environment. Further, it is put forward 
that the utilization of corporate governance theories could create efficiencies within government. 
The British Columbia Coroners Service is employed as a model within the provincial 
government to illustrate the current form of governance and to evaluate potential future 
efficiencies. Agency and transaction cost theories are utilized to examine the British Columbia 
Coroners Service within the context of the provincial government. The findings from this study 
indicate that corporate governance structures are applicable to the provincial government and 
that their use could assist in the optimization of the services within government. 
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Introduction 
The Provincial Government of British Columbia is in constant tension with the British 
Columbian public to provide the best service possible at the lowest possible cost. The public 
contributes taxes which they expect will be used in the most efficient manner to supply the 
services they believe the government should be providing. 
This strain has become even more pronounced given the recent global recession which 
has limited the amount of revenue collected by the Province. Limited revenue means that 
government is constrained in the amount of capital available to fund services for the public. 
Inadequate resources suggest that a focus on getting the most service, for the least amount of 
money, becomes necessary. Program efficacy becomes a priority for government so as to make 
the limited revenue go as far as possible. The public expects the government, as their 
representative, to commit to this measure. 
Provincial Government 
The Provincial Government of British Columbia is responsible for the implementation of 
services within the province. This process is lead by the elected government who acquired the 
majority of seats during the most recent election. For the purposes of this study, I will review 
three areas for which government is accountable to the public. 
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First, the government is responsible to establish the program lines of the Province. This 
requires the government to identify the priorities that they would like to address. From this work 
flows the establishment of the different Ministries within government. Within each of these 
Ministries resides the responsibility for a particular line of service. As an example, a "Ministry 
of Education" may be responsible to ensure education is available for the populace. 
Second, the government is responsible for setting the overall budget which will limit how 
much money will be spent by government. In addition to the overall money to be spent, the 
budget will also identify the specific ministries to which the money is to be allocated. 
Third, within the Ministries, government is responsible for identifying and developing the 
particular services that are to be offered to the public. Using the earlier example of a "Ministry 
of Education", government is accountable for the educational priorities that the Ministry is to 
meet. This might entail placing an emphasis on specific areas of education such as literacy or 
social competencies. Finally, the Ministry must decide on service models. Specifically, who is 
going to provide the service, and at what cost? 
British Columbia Coroners Service 
The British Columbia Coroners Service (BCCS) was established in 1871 at the time 
British Columbia joined the confederacy in Canada. However, it wasn't until the British 
Columbia Coroners Act of 1960 (Province of British Columbia 1960) that the roles of the 
modem day Coroner were first established. Although the job duties were identified, this 
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legislation made the BCCS responsible to the province as well as the local municipalities in 
which the Coroners were working. This Act was amended in 1972 to transfer all responsibility 
for the BCCS to the province (Province of British Columbia 1979). The mandate for the BCCS is 
to investigate and report on all sudden or unexpected deaths within the province of British 
Columbia. Essentially, the BCCS is to investigate all deaths with the exception of those that 
were from an expected natural disease process (e.g. cancer, heart disease etc.). The results of 
these investigations are to lead to better prevention of deaths in the future. 
The BCCS is led by the Chief Coroner who delegates his legislated authority to the 
individual Coroners throughout the Province. As part of the provincial government, the BCCS 
reports to a Deputy Minister for the Ministry of Public Safety and the Solicitor General. The 
Deputy Minister is the highest ranking public servant within the Ministry, and he/she reports to 
the Minister who is elected by the public. As an elected member of the Legislature, the Minister 
is responsible to the people of British Columbia. 
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Figure 1 Flowchart from the Public to British Columbia Coroners Service 
Purpose of the study 
This study will focus on the relationships between the public, politicians and public 
servants. Specifically, I will be looking at two primary questions. First, is it possible to utilize 
corporate governance models as a parallel to the governance of the British Columbia 
Government? Second, if corporate governance models prove to be analogous, is it possible to 
utilize these models to address efficiencies within government? The program delivery of the 
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British Columbia Coroners Service will be used as the model for this study. The three primary 
theoretical models to be utilized are constitutional economics, agency theory, and transaction 
cost economics. 
Methodology 
This study utilizes a 5 step process to answer the two research questions. The first step 
involves the completion of a literature review of all relevant research to provide a focus for 
approaching the governance questions. Using constitutional theory, the evolution of the present 
bureaucratic system in British Columbia is explored. The current legislative system has been 
drawn from the model developed in Great Britain which looks to the development of constraints 
to ensure the proper actions of those within the system. 
This study employs agency theory to examine the relationship between the principal and 
the agent in the British Columbian system. For this study we will define the principal as a 
citizen within British Columbia. The agent will be defmed as the public servants who are 
entrusted to deliver the services to the public. Specifically, we will be looking at the different 
mechanisms that can be utilized to ensure the agent is fulfilling the wishes of the principal. 
This study uses the transaction cost economics of Oliver Williamson (Williamson 2008, 
7). By utilizing this approach to the analysis of transactions, both inside and outside the firm, we 
will examine how to optimize the efficiency of the transactions. 
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The second step in the study is to illustrate the mandated responsibilities of the British 
Columbia Coroners Service. These responsibilities are assigned by the elected members of the 
Legislature and are the required services of the BCCS. 
In contrast, the third step in this study is to analyze the current operation of the BCCS. 
This review examines the physical makeup of the BCCS as well as the services that are currently 
being offered to the public 
The fourth step in the study is to utilize the research literature, mandated responsibilities, 
and the actual operation of the BCCS to answer the two research questions: Is it possible to 
utilize corporate governance models as a parallel to the governance of the British Columbia 
Government? Second, if corporate governance models prove to be analogous, is it possible to 
utilize these models to address efficiencies within government? Finally, the fifth step is to 
address any recommendations that may come from this research. 
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Literature Review 
The study of provincial authority in British Columbia has been relegated predominantly to 
the realm of political scientists and lawmakers. Governance processes within a provincial 
government have not received a high level of analysis. As such, there has been little study of the 
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progression from the initial wishes of the voters, to the endpoint actions of the government 
within a provincial framework. 
This study will utilize an economic perspective to illustrate there is a parallel between 
provincial and corporate governance. In addition, by drawing primarily from constitutional 
economics, agency theory and transaction cost economics, it will be shown that different forms 
of governance can affect differentially the nature of the relationship between the government and 
the public to whom they are responsible. The British Columbia Coroners Service will be used as 
the model for this examination. 
Constitutional Economics 
Van den Hauwe stated that constitutional economics was an evolution from the earlier 
"public choice" branch of economics (Van den Hauwe 2005, 223). Van den Hauwe placed his 
emphasis on "the rules that define the framework within which the ordinary choices of economic 
and political agents are made" (Van den Hauwe 2005, 224). Therefore, the rules that constrain 
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or limit the actions of political and economic agents are under examination. This is in contrast to 
the more orthodox approach which had the agent at the centre of the examination. As a result of 
this focus, the choice of constraints is reviewed as opposed to the choices that may be made by 
an agent within the constraints. 
Buchanan discussed what the appropriate question would be for a constitutional 
economist to study. (Buchanan 1993, 1) He believed it was important that constitutions be 
designed that would allow the survival of the public serving agent who had to work within them. 
Buchanan used the example of the politician who made decisions contrary to the public good so 
that he/she would be re-elected. He postulated that rather than having the agent behave 
improperly to secure their own position, the rules around the politician should be created that 
would allow those serving the public interest to survive. Buchanan' s work reflects the ideals 
initially set forth by Knut Wicksell that attempting to influence the behaviour of agents within a 
system is fundamentally flawed (Wicksell 1896). He suggested that the more effective path was 
to identify and establish rules which limit the choices that can be made by the agents who fall 
within these rules. 
Buchanan also discussed the notion of the most efficient path (Buchanan 1987, 247). 
Contrary to some beliefs that the most efficient option leads to consent from the people, 
Buchanan argued that it is actually consent from the people that leads to the most effective path. 
Basically, that if the people agree, efficiency flows from this agreement. Buchanan explains that 
this agreement does not require unanimity (Buchanan 1987, 247). A simple majority is sufficient 
for this measure to be successful. 
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Van den Hauwe states that this type of agreement acts as a social contract for the mutual 
benefit of the individuals (Van den Hauwe 2005, 230). It establishes social cooperation that will 
inevitably lead to the greater good of the majority. As this agreement should then be viewed as a 
public good, Van den Hauwe asserts the importance of maintaining this contract. 
Despite the implementation of constraints following agreement by the majority, Van den 
Hauwe states that it is to be expected there will be individuals, as well as groups, that will 
attempt to contravene the agreed upon constitution (Van den Hauwe 2005, 230). He goes on to 
say that without a strict constitution, opportunism can take two primary forms. First, individuals 
may seek to surpass the existing cooperative agreement for personal gain. Second, special 
interest groups may attempt to supersede established rules by placing inappropriate pressure on 
politicians. He states that the "incentive to engage in rent-seeking activities is directly 
proportional to the ease with which the political process can be used for personal (or interest 
group) gain at the expense of others" (Van den Hauwe 2005, 231). Buchanan' s earlier findings 
on constitutional constraints support Van den Hauwe's assertions (Buchanan 1997, 3). 
This "rent-seeking" behaviour that had been identified by Van den Hauwe was assessed 
further by Merville and Osborne (Merville and Osborne 1990, 21). Using basic principal-agent 
theory (principal=citizen, agent=govemment), Merville and Osborne state that vote maximizing 
agents can make arrangements with special interest groups to ensure they receive the necessary 
amount of votes to stay in power. This arrangement creates a situation where an inordinate share 
of the public goods can be controlled by a small group in exchange for votes for the politician. 
Buchanan asserts politics should function through a principle of generality that states all people 
should benefit from political action regardless of their inclusion in any particular group 
(Buchanan 1997, 6) . 
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Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 5) state that agency problems occur when 
the principal and the agent have different goals. Consistent with this statement, Eisenhardt states 
that agency theory is concerned with the situation that arises when one party (the principal) 
delegates work to a second party (the agent) (Eisenhardt 1989, 58). Eisenhardt reports that the 
theory can be utilized to study difficult contracting relationships (Eisenhardt 1989, 58). As 
examples, she identifies three situations where agency theory is beneficial: 
a) potential conflict between principals and agents where the agents may take advantage of 
the situation, 
b) there is risk associated with the successful completion of a project, and 
c) jobs in which it is difficult to measure the amount of work being completed. 
These three situations fall into two main categories of problems. The first problem arises 
when the principal and agent have different goals and it is either difficult or expensive for the 
principal to monitor if the agent is behaving properly. An example of this type of problem is 
when an agent is being paid an hourly wage to complete a project, and the principal doesn't 
know if the agent is behaving in an appropriate manner (i.e. applying a reasonable amount of 
effort on behalf of the principal). The second major problem arises when the principal and the 
agent have different ideas towards risk. This situation can arise when there is the potential issue 
of the job not being able to be completed for reasons beyond the control of principal or agent. 
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Eisenhardt concludes there are seven main components to agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989, 
59). 
1. Key idea 
2. Unit of Analysis 
3. Human Assumptions 
4. Organizational assumptions 
5. Information assumption 
6. Contracting problems 
7. Problem domain 
Principal-agent relationships reflect efficient 
organization of information and risk-bearing costs 
Contract between principal and agent analysis 
Self-interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk aversion 
Partial goal conflict among participants 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information as a purchasable commodity 
Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Relationships in which the principal and agent have 
partly differing goals and risk preferences (e.g. 
compensation, regulation, leadership, impression 
management, whistle-blowing, vertical integration, 
transfer pricing) 
Figure 2 Agency Theory Overview (Eisenhardt 1989, 59) 
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This model helps explain that the participants in a contract are the principal and the agent. 
It further illustrates the possible limitations of the individuals within the contract. These include 
self-interest, limited information and the aversion to personal risk. 
Jensen is a precursor to Eisenhardt's later assertions regarding the nature of contracting 
between principals and agents (Jensen 1983, 27). Jensen describes the lens of principal agent 
study to be focused on optimal risk sharing and contractual arrangements. He identifies three 
themes that are components of principal-agent relationships (Jensen 1983, 27) 
1) the preferences of the parties to the contract, 
2) the nature of uncertainty, and 
3) the informational structure in the environment. 
In relation to positive contractual arrangements within organizations, he states that "the 
organizational form, its contracts, will be those that minimize the agency costs" (Jensen 1983, 
22). 
Within agency theory a "positivist" stream has developed that deals primarily with 
governance mechanisms that could address the agency problem (Jensen, 1983, 4). Eisenhardt 
states that within this stream a series of propositions were developed to look at how to manage 
potential agency problems (Eisenhardt 1989, 60). Specifically, they address issues surrounding 
the nature of the contracts being considered. For instance, they assess when an outcome based 
contract (e.g. principal pays an agreed upon price to the agent for a particular end product) is 
more efficient than a behaviour based agreement (e.g. principal pays the agent a salary to work 
on a project). In addition, they also address factors including risk, information systems, task 
programmability, outcome measurability and goal conflict between the principal and agent. By 
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evaluating the different basic variables, the propositions outline a relative optimal form of 
agreement. 
For the purposes of this study, we will examine five of the ten principles (Eisenhardt 1989, 
60). 
Proposition 1: When the contract between the principal and agent is outcome based, the 
agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal. 
Proposition 2: When the principal has information to verify agent behaviour, the agent is 
more likely to behave in the interests of the principal. 
Proposition 3: Information systems are positively related to behaviour-based contracts and 
negatively related to outcome-based contracts. 
Proposition 4: Outcome uncertainty is positively related to behaviour-based contracts and 
negatively related to outcome-based contracts. 
Proposition 5: The risk averswn of the agent is positively related to behaviour-based 
contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts. 
In addition to these propositions, it is important to measure the trade-off between the cost 
of measuring behaviour, measuring outcomes and the cost of transferring risk. Overall, agency 
theory predicts that risk-neutral managers are likely to choose the "make" option (behaviour-
based contract), whereas risk-averse executives are likely to choose the "buy" (outcome-based 
contract). 
Within agency theory it is asserted that if the principal was able to provide the right 
incentives to their agents, the company would run without pause. Although there are a great 
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number of companies that utilize incentive contracts (outcome-based), Miller and Whitford stress 
that most rely upon monitoring and sanctioning to motivate agents (Miller and Whitford 2006, 
213). Monitoring agents is seen as one way to combat the moral hazard that can arise from agent 
self-interest. They discuss the problem of aligning the effort of the agent with the return on that 
effort. In particular, this issue arises when the effort is unobservable to the principal. This 
creates an information asymmetry as the principal cannot know what other factors may have 
been present that influenced the amount of return. 
Miller and Whitford use the example of a tenant farm worker (agent) and the absentee 
landowner (principal) (Miller and Whitford 2006, 216). There is an outcome based contract that 
stipulates the principal will receive a percentage of the profits from the agent's working of the 
land. The principal will not know the level of effort put forth by the agent as it is unobservable. 
A decline in return could be from other variables such as poor weather. Conversely, the crop 
could improve through good weather even though the farmer shirked that season. 
To address this informational discrepancy, the landowner has the ability to implement 
monitoring systems that might indicate the level of work done by the farmer. It might also be 
able to highlight any external variables that affected the crop yield. This monitoring system adds 
additional expense that might make it inefficient to utilize, however, it does lower risk to the 
principal. 
Miller and Whitford discuss the difficulty of aligning incentives when there is 
information asymmetry (Miller and Whitford 2006, 214). Basically, it becomes difficult for the 
principal to replace monitoring an agent with a more efficacious outcome based system. This 
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leaves the principal to either assume more risk or adopt the more efficient monitoring to address 
the information asymmetry and potential moral hazard. 
Miller and Whitford state that incentive based contracts have two primary constraints 
(Miller and Whitford 2006, 215). The first constraint is the ability of the agent to achieve the 
desired outcome. If the agent suffers from a social efficiency constraint, they assert that the level 
of bonus necessary to make a difference would be inefficiently large. In this circumstance a 
monitoring and sanctioning system would be most effective. 
The second constraint refers to a moral hazard for the principal. This arises when the 
principal won ' t implement an incentive system even though it would be efficient. This is what 
they refer to as the "principal's moral hazard" . This hazard is a result of the level of incentive 
necessary to motivate the agent being too high for the principal. Although this level of incentive 
may not be inordinately large, it is possible for the principal to receive a higher profit from a less 
efficient monitoring based system. In essence, the principal could make more money by having 
the agent produce less with the inefficient monitoring system, than to implement an efficient 
outcome based structure for higher returns. 
duPlessis states that attempting to use the "' Agency Logic' (Zajac & Westphal , 2004, p. 
435) that underpins governance and its reforms and that considers the primary domain of 
corporate governance as managing the dyadic tension between management and shareholders" is 
ineffective (duPlessis 2008, 783). This tension is based on the assumption that the shareholder 
(principal) is only interested in having management (agent) make them money. Instead, he states 
that it is more effective to work with the assumption that the principal is actually a stakeholder 
who is interested in having more than increased money as the deliverable. 
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In contrast to agency logic, du Plessis proposed the creation of a new "value logic" based 
on stakeholder theory (duPlessis 2008 , 792). He identified that the view of the corporation as an 
investment system has limited our perspective of shareholder value to only that of a financial 
resource. He doesn ' t deny that financial returns are important to shareholders, but he states that 
these shareholders are also able to identify other positive characteristics of a company. The 
recent growth of environmentally friendly investment portfolios would support this assertion. 
In addition, du Plessis stated that he believed there were concerns about the wishes of the 
principal, but he also expressed concern about the potential for self-interest from the agent. To 
address both of these concerns, du Plessis suggests the "MacMill proposals" first introduced by 
MacAvoy and Millstein (MacAvoy and Millstein 2003, 107). du Plessis states that these 
proposals address two main issues (du Plessis 2008, 784). First, in corporate governance, they 
identify the need for the board to be independent. In particular, the importance of having the 
chair of the board be independent rather than the CEO of the company. This assists in ethical 
concerns about the board potentially being in a conflict of interest regarding decisions for the 
company. In particular, this addresses the concern about the board being comprised of 
individuals from the management who are engaged in self-interested behaviour. 
Second, duPlessis states that the MacMill proposals address the need for the board to be 
responsible for strategy formulation, risk management and financial reporting (du Plessis 2008, 
784). This course ensures that management does not engage in self-interested behaviours at the 
cost of the company. It also ensures that the correct information makes it to the board for their 
decision making. An example would be management emphasizing growth maximization. This 
growth may benefit the management through bonuses and greater prestige, but it could be at the 
cost of the company. 
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In addition, du Plessis ( du Plessis 2008, 786) highlights that boards have a legal 
requirement to act in the best interests of the company. In Smith v. Van Gorkom (1985), the 
Delaware Supreme Court directed a judgement against the board of Trans Union for negligently 
agreeing to a buyout proposal that had been put forward by the CEO and chair of the board. The 
courts found that the board gave approval to the buyout without giving adequate thought or 
seeking any outside expert advice. They also stated that the board was negligent by not 
disclosing all relevant information prior to seeking approval from their shareholders. 
New Institutional Economics 
In 1986, R.C.O. Matthews stated that the new institutional economics (NIE) was formed 
around two propositions (Matthews 1986, 903). First, institutions do matter. Second, 
institutions are capable of being studied through economic theory. The transaction cost 
foundation of NIE is based upon three main fields: economics, organization theory, and law 
(Williamson 2008, 1 0). Williamson explains that all three fields had rebelled against the 
previous resource allocation theories that oversimplified the institution into basic inputs and 
outputs. It wasn't until the 1970's that the development of transaction cost economics transpired 
(Williamson 2008, 12). 
Although it is clear that economics would be the basis ofNIE, organization theory is also 
important (Williamson 2008, 1 0). Williamson describes organization theory has having three 
important features relevant to NIE. 
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1) There is a variance in human capacity throughout the population. 
2) Humans have "bounded rationality". 
This term is defined by Simon as " intendedly rational , but only limitedly so" 
(Simon 1957, xxiv). 
3) There is a multi-divisional structure which allows strategic and operational decisions 
to be separated. Thus, organizational theory provides a foundation for the focus on 
contracts (Williamson 2003, 917). 
David M. Kreps asserts that in traditional economics, the firm is equivalent to an agent 
(Kreps 1990, 96). With an NIE lens, Kreps posits that a firm is more like a market where 
individuals can transact. Despite this difference, agency theory and transaction cost economics 
have some similarities. Barney and Ouchi discuss that the two theories share the important 
assumptions of self-interest and bounded rationality (Barney and Ouchi 1986). However, despite 
these shared assumptions, the two theories come from different foundations in economics 
(Spence 1975, 164). 
John R. Commons presented the concept of every transaction having three components: 
conflict, mutuality and order (Commons 1932, 4) . This concept has become fundamental to the 
study of governance and is known as the "Commons triple". In line with this proposition, 
Williamson states that governance acts as the means to instil order which will mitigate conflict 
and lead to mutual gains (Williamson 2008, 8). 
Buchanan described politics as "a structure of complex exchange among individuals, a 
structure within which persons seek to secure collectively their own privately defmed objectives 
that cannot be efficiently secured through simple market exchanges" (Buchanan 1987, 246). He 
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highlights that exchanges m these systems are not simple, and, in fact, reqmre complex 
contractual arrangements. As such, these exchanges become the unit of analysis which 
transaction cost economics can study. 
The lens of contract approach has three important differences from traditional orthodox 
approaches (Williamson 2003, 917). First, the lens of contract focuses on the gains from the 
transaction rather than the traditional focus on prices and output. Second, traditional approaches 
have viewed the fum as a production function whereas the contractual lens sees the firm as a 
governance structure. Third, the lens of contract is more focused on microanalysis. Ultimately, 
Williamson states that the primary idea is to switch from the traditional lens of choice to the lens 
of contract. 
Williamson reports that there are six key supporting moves when utilizing a comparative 
contractual approach to economics (Williamson 2003, 922-926). 
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1) Human actors 
Transaction cost economics states that human actors have three primary 
attributes: 
a) Cognition 
Bounded rationality 
b) Self-interest 
Adverse selection, moral hazard and general opportunism 
o Parties to a long-term contract will attempt opportunism 
when the contract encounters any misalignment 
c) Foresight 
Parties to a contract have the ability to look ahead and plan 
according! y 
2) Unit of Analysis 
The three relevant factors for governance are: 
a) Asset specificity 
A measure of non-deployability 
b) Unanticipated disturbances 
Transactions are subject to these unexpected changes that result in 
re-negotiation (and related cost) of the contract if not planned for 
in advance 
c) Frequency with which transactions recur 
3) Intertemporal transformations 
After a contract has been awarded and accepted, there is no longer 
parity between the winner of the bid and all others. 
4) Operational purpose: Adaptation 
a) Autonomous adaptation 
Individual parties respond to market opportunities 
b) Cooperative adaptation 
Firms adapt internally 
5) Governance structures 
Markets engage high powered incentives and settle disputes 
legalistically, whereas hierarchies work out of low powered 
incentives with internal dispute resolution 
6) Discriminating alignment 
Firms, markets, hybrids and bureaux are all forms of governance 
with increasing levels of cooperative adaptation capability 
o As asset specificity and disturbances grow, the need for 
cooperative adaption grows commensurately. 
Figure 3 Williamson's Six Keys (Williamson 2003, 922-926) 
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In addition, the attributes that describe the mode of governance are: 
1) Incentive intensity 
2) Administrative controls 
3) The legal rules regime (Williamson 2003, 925). 
Williamson defines public bureaux as a public sector counterpart to the profit 
maximizing firm (Williamson 2003, 932). The bureaux utilize very low-powered 
incentives and experiences added bureaucratic encumbrances in comparison to the firm. 
Dixit addressed the belief that bureaucracies were all-knowing, all-powerful and 
benevolent (Dixit 1996, 8). As with all other forms of governance, bureaux have their 
problems. 
Williamson states that despite these added burdens, it is important to evaluate the 
governance structure within the context of the transactions it accommodates (Williamson 
2003, 932). Williamson notes there is a common practice of condemning public bureaux 
because of their low powered incentives, and their potentially cumbersome rules and 
regulations (Williamson 2000, 603). He states that this criticism misses the mark as it 
ignores the fact that these qualities have been purposefully built into the governance 
model. 
As per the concept of discriminating alignment, there are some transactions that 
require the characteristics of bureaux. He uses the example of national foreign policy to 
illustrate the nature of an extremely complex interaction that requires the governance 
structure of a bureau. Transactions that are best suited to the public bureaux are those 
22 I Page 
that benefit from low-powered incentives and that are responstve to the needs of 
governments (Williamson 1999, 1101). 
Using transaction cost economics, Williamson argued that whenever a transaction 
is moved from the market to inside the firm, there is a corresponding bureaucratic cost 
(Williamson 2003, 932). Therefore, he states that moving a transaction from the market 
into the firm should only happen for compelling reasons. This is a result of the firm 
being a form of governance as opposed to the traditional view of the firm as a production 
of actors. 
The Competency Perspective 
The competency perspective was developed as a complementary area of study to transaction 
cost economics. This perspective looks at the competencies within a firm as they impact the 
efficiency of the firm's transactions. Teece, Pisano and Shuen defined the firm's fundamental 
business as its core (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997, 516). Therefore, the firm's core 
competencies must be derived from its products and services. 
In contrast, Dosi and Teece define the competence perspective with a focus on the 
firm's organizational capabilities as opposed to its products or services: 
" ... a firm's distinctive competence needs to be understood as a reflection of distinctive 
organizational capabilities to coordinate and to learn. By 'organizational capabilities' we mean 
the capabilities of an enterprise to organize, man~ge, coordinate, or govern sets of activities. The 
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set of activities that a firm can organize and coordinate better than other firms is its distinctive 
competencies. Posed differently, a distinctive competence is a differentiated set of skills, 
complementary assets, and organization routines which together allow a firm to coordinate a 
particular set of activities in a way that provides the basis for competitive advantage in a 
particular market or markets" (Dosi and Teece 1998, 284). 
As a result of a firm's distinctive competence, Hodgson states that they can have an 
efficiency advantage compared to markets (Hodgson 1998, 195). This is a result of the learning, 
knowledge and length of time actors have worked together within the firm. However, this 
requires that any transaction that would allow this proprietary knowledge to leave the firm would 
have to be blocked. Instead, the firm would have to undertake the transaction internally (Teece 
1986, 295). Williamson states that the study of competence acts as a complementary field of 
study to transaction cost theory (Williamson 1999, 1 098). 
Budgeting and contract costs 
Eric Patashnik approached the study of public expenditures by v1ewmg budgets as 
contracts and using transaction cost theory (Patashnik 1996, 189). He defmed transaction costs 
as those that are incurred through negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements. These 
costs include the time taken by actors in making decisions as well as those maladaption costs that 
occur when a contract breaks down. In addition, the transaction costs include expenses 
generated from conflict resolution over these contract failures. Patashnik argues that 
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opportunism heavily influences choices made by public institutions (Patashnik 1996, 206). 
Further, the meanmg of efficiency m a government context IS questioned due to this 
opportunism. 
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Current Model: British Columbia 
Coroners Service 
The British Columbia Coroners Service operates from the authority of the provincial 
Coroners Act (Province of British Columbia 2007). This legislation was approved by a majority 
of the political representatives within the legislature, ensuring that the public is properly 
represented in its creation and acceptance. The Act states that there are three primary mandated 
responsibilities for which the BCCS is accountable: Investigations, Inquests and Child Deaths. 
Investigations 
First, the BCCS must investigate all deaths: 
as a result of violence, accident, negligence, misconduct or malpractice, 
as a result of a self-inflicted illness or injury, 
suddenly and unexpectedly, when the person was apparently in good health and 
not under the care of a medical practitioner, 
from disease, sickness or unknown cause, for which the person was not treated 
by a medical practitioner, 
during pregnancy, or following pregnancy m circumstances that might 
reasonably be attributable to pregnancy, 
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if the chief coroner reasonably believes it is in the public interest that a class of 
deaths be reported and issues a notice in accordance with the regulations, in the 
circumstances set out in the notice, 
while detained by or in the custody, or in a custodial facility, of a peace officer, 
as a result, directly or indirectly, of an act of a peace officer performed in the 
course of his or her duty 
while a patient of a designated facility or private mental hospital within the 
meaning of the Mental Health Act, whether or not on the premises or in actual 
detention, 
while the person is committed to a correctional centre, youth custody centre or 
penitentiary or a police prison or lockup, whether or not on the premises or in 
custody, or 
in any prescribed circumstances. 
(Province of British Columbia 2007) 
In a Coroner' s investigation, the scene of the death, the history of the deceased, and the 
physical state of the deceased at the time of death are explored. The Coroners Act provides the 
means of fulfilling these enquiries. This legislation gives broad authority to the Coroner to fulfill 
their duties; however, there are two major constraints on the Coroner. First, the Coroner is not 
allowed to fmd fault. Therefore, no one is in legal jeopardy by the granting of these authorities. 
Second, the Coroner is constrained from investigating any death for which there is a possible or 
perceived personal conflict of interest. 
These restrictions notwithstanding, the Act allows the investigating Coroner to enter any 
residence or building in which the deceased was found, or the Coroner believes the deceased to 
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have attended. The Coroner may seize any records or items including medical records or items 
related to the deceased etc. This authority allows the Coroner to review the deceased's history, 
as well as to assess how the deceased may have come to their death. To gather all relevant 
information held by others, the Coroner has the ability to compel statements from witnesses 
through subpoenas. Finally, the Coroner is responsible for taking possession of the body of the 
deceased. The Coroner may direct that an autopsy be completed to determine the cause of death 
of the deceased. Under the legislation, any individual who disturbs the body of the deceased, 
without direction from the Coroner, commits an offence. This is to ensure that the integrity of 
the evidence remains intact. 
At the conclusion of the investigation, there are two possible outcomes. The most 
common conclusion is for a Report to be prepared for the Chief Coroner. This Report must 
outline the identity of the deceased, as well as how, when, where and by what means the person 
came to their death. The Coroner may make recommendations designed to prevent future loss of 
life in similar circumstances. The second possible outcome for an investigation is for the 
Coroner to recommend that the file be concluded through an Inquest. 
28 I Page 
Inquests 
The second primary responsibility mandated by the legislation is the holding of an 
Inquest into a death. The Chief Coroner holds the responsibility to decide if an investigation 
should be completed by Inquest. The Chief Coroner will direct an Inquest be initiated when 
there is reason to believe the deceased died while detained by or in the custody, or in a custodial 
facility, of a peace officer. The Chief Coroner may also order an Inquest be held if they believe: 
a) the public has an interest in being informed of the circumstances surrounding the 
death, or 
b) the death resulted from a dangerous practice or circumstance, and similar deaths 
could be prevented if recommendations were made to the public or an authority 
(Province of British Columbia 2007). 
Under the Coroners Act, the Minister of Public Safety and the Solicitor General also has 
the authority to direct the BCCS to hold an Inquest. This is only to be done if the BCCS has not 
conducted an Inquest and the Minister believes it is in the public interest for one to be held. 
Conversely, the Minister for the Attorney General ' s Ministry has the authority to direct an 
Inquest not be held if there is a criminal investigation into the death. This authority is given to 
ensure that the integrity of the criminal investigation is not negatively affected by testimony at 
the Inquest. The Chief Coroner may direct the Inquest to go forward when charges are either 
withdrawn or the criminal proceedings have been completed. 
An Inquest is a quasi-judicial public hearing designed to ascertain the circumstances of a 
death. The Coroner presides over the Inquest to ensure the efficacy of the process and that all 
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rules and procedures are followed. A jury of five members of the community hear testimony 
from sworn witnesses under oath. The Coroner is responsible to ensure all relevant witnesses 
and evidence are made available to the jury so they can render an informed verdict. 
The Inquest takes place in the community (or as close to the community as practicable) in 
which the death took place. This is to ensure that the jury is comprised of members of the 
community in which the death took place. In addition, it also provides the local public 
(presumably those with the greatest interest) the ability to attend the Inquest and hear the 
testimony of those involved. 
Persons who believe that their interests may be affected by the Inquest have the right to 
apply to participate in the proceedings. This allows the individuals to direct questions to the 
witnesses who will appear to give testimony. These witnesses are questioned first by a 
designated Inquest Counsel. Then, those persons granted participant status are allowed to 
question the witness. Finally, the jury is allowed to direct questions to the witness. 
When all witnesses have been heard, the jury retires to decide their verdict. This verdict 
is to include the same information as a Coroners Report (who, how, when, where, by what 
means) as well as the ability to make recommendations to prevent future loss of life in similar 
circumstances. However, as with Coroners Reports, the jury is not allowed to find fault or apply 
blame. 
The primary benefit of the Inquest process is that it is transparent and open to the public. 
In Canada, the media holds the right to publish all testimony presented at an Inquest. This is 
granted so that the public who are unable to attend personally are still able to receive the 
information held in the proceeding. 
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Child Deaths 
The Coroners Act requires that all deaths of children be reported to the Coroners Service 
for review. Unlike other reportable deaths, children's deaths can be from known natural causes 
but must still be reported. The purpose of this further review is to have one government 
organization be responsible for discovering and monitoring any trends that may develop with 
child deaths. This information is to be reported to the public and to the relevant agencies that 
have a stake in trying to prevent further loss of life. 
The Chief Coroner is responsible for the establishment of a separate "Child Death 
Review Unit" that is to undertake a secondary review, following the Coroner' s investigation or 
Inquest, of all reported child deaths. This review will be looking at investigations conducted by 
Coroners as well as looking at natural deaths reported by the relevant health agencies involved in 
the child ' s care (Children ' s Hospital , MacDonald House etc.). This unit is responsible to report 
annual trends through public reports that are sent out to associated agencies and are posted 
online. 
In addition, this unit has the ability to create a Review Panel that would bring experts from 
different fields to re-evaluate a group of cases with related features. For instance, a panel 
composed of paediatric specialists, pathologists, car seat manufacturers, motor vehicle branch 
specialists, and policing authorities may be convened to review deaths of children in motor 
vehicle incidents. This panel would then report out to the public with their findings as well as 
any recommendations they feel may be beneficial and practical. 
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Organizational Structure 
The British Columbia Coroners Service is based in Burnaby, B.C., to be physically 
separate from the political structure in Victoria, B.C.. The Head Office is home to the Chief and 
Deputy Chief Coroners as well as the leads for the three mandated programs. The Chief Coroner 
receives his authority from the Lieutenant Governor of the province and is responsible for 
delegating this authority to the Coroners in the field . It is the responsibility of the Deputy Chief 
Coroner to oversee the three mandated programs on behalf of the Chief Coroner. 
The Chief Coroner receives the BCCS budget from the Ministry of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General. The expectation ofthe Minister is that the Chief Coroner will meet the BCCS ' 
mandated responsibilities within this annual budgetary allotment. It is the Chief Coroner's 
responsibility to develop and institute the program lines within the BCCS so that these objectives 
are met within the given financial constraints. 
The current structure of the BCCS has six program lines reporting to the Deputy Chief 
Coroner. These lines are Policy and Research Systems, Legal Services and Inquests, Medical 
Investigation, Identification and Disaster Response Unit, Child Death Unit, and Operations. 
Financial and human resource lines are also centralized to the Head Office, but are not included 
in this study as they are not directly related to service delivery. 
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Figure 4 British Columbia Coroners Service Organizational chart 
Operations 
The Operations stream of the BCCS is led by a Director who oversees five Regions 
within the province. 
Deputy Chief Coroner 
~ 
Director of Operations 
l I j I 1 
Island Metro Fraser Interior North 
Figure 5 BCCS Operations Hierarchy 
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Each of these five regwns has a Regional Coroner who is responsible to manage the 
investigations within their catchment area. Within the greater Vancouver area (Fraser and Metro 
Regions), investigations are completed by full time government staff. In the Island, Interior and 
North Regions, the regional offices have either one or two full time management staff to support 
the Regional Coroner in the administration of the regwn. However, the majority of the 
investigations are completed by Community Coroners. 
Community Coroners are employed by the province but are not public service workers. 
As a consequence, their employment falls under the Employment Standards Act. Unlike the full 
time Coroners who receive a salary, Community Coroners are paid an hourly wage that is 
embedded in the regulations of the Coroners Act. They bill for all time spent investigating a 
death as well as any follow up reports that may be necessary. 
Coroners are required to speak with family, friends, physicians and all other relevant 
agencies that may be involved with the investigation (police services, employers etc.). 
Information gathered from these individuals provides the Coroner with much of the information 
necessary for their investigation. Although these interactions take place in the framework of an 
investigation, it is important to keep in mind the overall context involves the death of an 
individual and requires the Coroner to be respectful and often supportive of those with whom 
they are speaking. 
At the conclusion of an investigation, the Coroner is responsible for completing a 
"Coroners Report". This report is a public document that is released to any person who makes a 
request. The report is to include the name of the deceased, as well as the how, what, when, 
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where and by what means the person came to their death. The report also will have a 
classification of death assigned from five options. The death will be classified as natural, 
suicide, accidental, homicide, or undetermined in those circumstances where the investigation is 
unable to identify a presumptive classification. 
In addition, Coroners are required to fill in protocol forms for homicides, motor vehicle 
incidents, suicides and child deaths. These protocol forms capture data that is relevant to the 
particular incident. For example, a death by suicide will have questions relating to previous 
mental health concerns, treatment, medications etc, whereas, the motor vehicle protocol would 
have information relating to the state of the driver, vehicle, etcetera. These protocols allow 
efficient gathering of aggregate data to be reviewed provincially to look at trends and possible 
prevention options. 
Policy and Research Systems 
The Policy and Research Systems department is comprised of one manager, a research 
officer, a data analyst and one computer support analyst. This department is responsible for a 
range of services; however, the primary responsibility of this program is based in the gathering 
and disseminating of relevant information. The root of all BCCS activities is to prevent future 
deaths through investigation of current deaths. The program is accountable for the development 
and maintenance of a database that would hold all relevant investigatory information for further 
evaluation. It is with this database that BCCS is able to identify trends and report out to the 
relevant partners, agencies, and the public with a goal of future prevention of death. 
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The research officer and data analyst are tasked with extracting information from the 
database to assist with this goal of prevention. An example of this kind of data mining is the 
provincial breakdown of all motor vehicle deaths. The information from the database is able to 
establish where the majority of incidents have taken place, as well as the time of year and other 
potentially contributory statistics (e.g. alcohol related, etcetera) . This information is then used 
by policing services, transportation services, health authorities and others to focus their 
resources. 
All policy development within the BCCS is written in conjunction with the Manager of 
the Policy and Research Systems. This ensures that all policies and procedures are consistent 
throughout the agency. In addition, this department is responsible for the complementary 
position of handling all freedom of information requests . 
Legal Services and Inquests 
The Legal Services and Inquest department is comprised of a lawyer and an 
administrative assistant and has the responsibility of being accountable for all legal actions being 
undertaken by the BCCS. In practice, this takes two primary forms. The first involves providing 
legal advice and coordinating any responses to legal actions with which the BCCS is involved. 
For instance, the lawyer would act for the BCCS should there be a legal challenge to the actions 
taken by a Coroner. 
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The second area of responsibility is to act as Inquest Counsel at all scheduled Inquests. 
The role of Inquest Counsel is to lead the questioning of all witnesses presented by the Coroner. 
This requires the lawyer to travel throughout the province as Inquests are held in the community 
where the death occurred. 
Medical Investigations 
The Medical Investigations department has one medical doctor retained on contract as the 
Director of the program, as well as two part time contract medical practitioners and one medical 
Coroner (investigating Coroner with specialized medical training). This department fulfills three 
primary areas of responsibility. First, the department acts as a support to the operations 
department by providing medical advice. Should an investigating Coroner have a question 
regarding the nature of a disease process they are able to access the expertise of the department. 
Second, the department may assume jurisdiction for investigations of a particularly 
complicated medical nature. This could include questions involving allegations of inadequate or 
inappropriate medical treatment leading to the death of an individual. The department would 
investigate the death and complete a public Coroners Report as required by the legislation. 
Finally, the department coordinates medical policies and practices for the BCCS. This 
includes assisting with the development of policies and procedures for investigations of natural 
deaths. It also coordinates information sharing and planning between outside resources 
including hospitals, pathology and the College of Physicians and Surgeons. 
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Identification and Disaster Response Unit 
The Identification and Disaster Response Unit (IDRU) is comprised of a manager, a 
Coroner, an identification analyst, a geographic information systems analyst and a records 
assistant. This Unit has two primary areas of responsibility. First, IDRU is responsible for 
coordinating proactive planning in the event of a disaster leading to multiple fatalities . As an 
example, this could include deaths from natural disasters like flooding, or man-made incidents 
like an airline disaster. This preparation is to ensure that should a disaster occur an appropriate 
coordinated response from all related agencies takes place. 
The second area of responsibility is to assist in the identification of the deceased. In 
particular, to assist with the identification of persons who have remained unidentified. For 
example, the IDRU was utilized to identify disarticulated feet that had been discovered along 
coastlines. Using deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing, and geographical information systems 
(GIS), the IDRU cross referenced missing persons and attempted to match their DNA. The 
IDRU maintains a DNA database of missing persons for future identification. 
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Child Death Unit 
As per the Coroners Act, the BCCS is required to have a child death review unit to 
identify and monitor trends in the deaths of children. The unit does a secondary review of 
Coroners investigations from across the province with an eye towards identifying broad trends 
that may develop across the province. The unit is staffed by a manager, a medical reviewer, an 
injury prevention specialist, a child death Coroner, a case reviewer/project manager, and a 
program assistant. 
The unit uses the child death protocols completed by Coroners during the initial 
investigation, as well as a second protocol completed by their own staff, to identify trends and 
develop potential recommendations. This information is then reported to related agencies and 
the public. This reporting takes the form of an annual report that presents the aggregate data 
gathered through the protocols. In addition, reports may be generated to address an identified 
trend that may have been discovered. Both reports are available in hard copy form or on the 
BCCS website. 
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Analysis 
An analysis of the mandated responsibilities, and the current operations of the BCCS, 
illustrates that there is a high degree of mandated responsibility as well as additional services 
being provided by the agency. As an example, although the BCCS is mandated by the legislation 
to complete investigations and present a final "Coroners Report", service and support beyond the 
legislation are also offered to the families of the deceased. 
After review, it is clear that the current governance model shows both strengths as well as 
weaknesses. It is fundamental that a government that holds a majority of seats in the Legislature 
has received an endorsement from the majority of voters in the province. As a result, the 
decision making of the government should reflect a high degree of efficiency given the 
consent/support of the majority of the people. In those circumstances where a minority 
government is in place, the premise is that the government in power will obtain support from 
members of other parties within the Legislature. This will again ensure that legislative decisions 
receive the support of the majority of voters. 
The British Columbia government operates through the use of constraints as opposed to 
inducements or incentives. These constraints are the rules for both the bureaucratic as well as 
the political side of the business and take the form of legislation, policies, and procedures. The 
BCCS mandate and authority flows from the legislation of the Coroners Act. This Act lists what 
is expected of the service including investigations, inquests and child death review. It also 
identifies the ability of the Coroner to take action in the fulfillment of this mandate. 
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Policies govern public service workers both within their branch of government as well as the 
broader public service within government. As an example, all public service employees are 
subject to the Standards of Conduct implemented through the Public Service Agency of 
government. These policies are the rules that regulate behaviour within the government. They 
include policies regarding confidentiality, public commentary, workplace behaviour (harassment 
guidelines etc.) and conflicts of interest. 
Within the BCCS, policies are developed that become the rules for how to fulfill the 
mandate. For example, BCCS has policies on what assays will be undertaken in the case of a 
motor vehicle incident. This directs the Coroner regarding what is necessary for the 
investigation while also ensuring a consistent level of service to the public. 
Procedures within the BCCS are an extension of the policies. These procedures are steps that 
should be taken for the Coroner to fulfill the policy. As an example, the policy may state that 
information needs to be seized by the investigating Coroner. The procedure for the Coroner to 
seize documentation may include directions on how to draft the warrant for the aforementioned 
information. Therefore, if policies are the rules, the procedures are the guidelines for how to 
follow the rules. 
As previously stated, politicians also expenence constraints while working within 
government. At the legislative level, politicians are constrained by the need to have a majority 
support their assertion. It is required for the government to put forth its proposed plans for the 
upcoming session to the entire Legislature. These plans include any proposed new laws as well 
as all budget allocations. The Legislature as a whole will then vote on whether the plans are 
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supported. If the majority of the Legislature supports the plan, it will go forward . This again 
supports the notion that consent creates efficiency. 
At the Ministry level, politicians are constrained by the province ' s Constitution Act which 
outlines the role of the Legislature as well as those who work within it. However, these controls 
are limited to only two measures. First, the Act dictates who is eligible to sit in the Legislature. 
As an example, members of the Federal House of Commons are not allowed to sit in the 
Legislature. Second, the Act outlines broad conflict of interest guidelines. The conflict of 
interest guidelines are aimed at preventing members of the Legislature from profiting through the 
sale of goods or services to government, or from benefiting by being associated with a business 
that receives money from the government. 
These rules support the proper actions of the politicians; however, there are not any 
structures m place to protect politicians from recetvmg undue influence by "rent seeking" 
groups. An example of this situation is when a special interest group, representing a small 
number of people, insists on having decisions made in their favour or they will campaign to have 
the politician removed from their seat. The politician either acquiesces to the pressure or they 
face losing their position. So, although the politician is limited by the Constitution Act from 
profiting financially from their position, there are not any restrictions on behaviours designed to 
keep the politician in office. This presents a challenge to the principle of generality that asserts 
all should benefit from political decision making regardless of inclusion in a particular group. 
Ultimately, the issue of greatest importance is whether the public is receiving the service that 
it desires. As constraints have proven to be only moderately successful in ensuring the proper 
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behaviour of the public servant, other means need to be implemented to maximize the efficiency 
of the contract between the public and those who serve them. 
As with any agreement, the contract between the public and their public servants has the 
potential for deviation to occur. In the circumstance of the BCCS, it would be very difficult for 
the general public to have a complete understanding of the role and mandate of the service. The 
public needs to rely on their elected representatives to ensure that the BCCS is doing what it 
should be doing to serve the province. 
This trust places the onus on the political representative and their executive bureaucrats 
(Deputy Minister) to make certain the public is properly served. This creates a situation for the 
BCCS within government that is analogous to a corporate hierarchy. 
Government Corporate 
Public Shareholder 
t ~ 
Political Body 
l 
Board of Directors 
t 
Deputy Minister Executive Management 
~ ~ 
BCCS Worker 
Figure 6 Government and Corporate Governance Structures 
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In both of these circumstances there is the potential for the principal (public and shareholder) 
to have different goals from the agent (BCCS and Worker). As an example, the BCCS mandate 
is to investigate deaths with the ultimate goal of the prevention of deaths in similar 
circumstances. It is possible the BCCS may approach this goal in a manner that the public may 
not feel appropriate to their needs. Specifically, that BCCS may spend government's limited 
resources in a manner that does not provide the optimal return for the public. 
A second potential issue that can arise between the principal and the agent is the concept of 
risk. In this circumstance, risk is related to the ability of the agent to complete the task set by the 
principal. For the BCCS, this could mean that the public would demand a quality and/or quantity 
of mandated service that is unattainable within the budget allocated to the BCCS. As the BCCS 
is predominantly an operational service, the quantity of investigations varies depending upon 
circumstances beyond the control of either the principal or agent. 
To address these concerns it is important to create an efficient contract by addressing the risk 
preferences of the parties, the nature of the uncertainty, and the informational structure of the 
service. These three factors decide whether the contractual arrangement is best optimized 
through an outcome-based agreement or behaviour-based agreement. 
The role of the BCCS is to investigate designated deaths as they occur in the province of 
British Columbia. Therefore, the quantity of the work to be completed is uncertain from year to 
year. A fixed budget for the BCCS creates internal stress between the quantity and quality of the 
investigations. During a period of low operational demand, it is possible to dedicate more 
resources to broaden service beyond the mandated responsibilities of the legislation. However, if 
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the operational demand is higher than projected, this creates more work to be completed with the 
same amount of resources. With a fixed budget system, the risk is borne by the BCCS. 
As previously mentioned, the BCCS utilizes a database which stores information gathered 
through investigations and Inquests. This database is utilized to generate statistics which are 
then used to identify potential trends. As an example, statistics developed by the BCCS are used 
by policing services to target specific areas that would benefit from increased police presence. In 
particular, policing services have used the information to increase traffic patrols in designated 
areas which have shown a subsequent drastic decrease in motor vehicle related deaths. 
In addition to the abovementioned prevention role of the database, this database also records 
the hours and types of tasks completed by the Coroners. As a result, it is possible to limit the 
potential moral hazard of the individual Coroner through the use of the database which records 
all activities for which there is financial cost. This information system allows a level of 
monitoring that supports the use of behaviour-based contracting between the government and the 
BCCS. 
With the information available through the database, it is possible to identify which 
responsibilities draw the most resources as it is possible to chart which investigations take the 
most resources (time and money) to complete. With a goal of providing the best possible 
service, from a limited amount of resources, the information within the database allows strategic 
decisions to be made regarding the nature of the work to be completed. To ensure the BCCS is 
meeting the wishes of the public, these strategic decisions must be made in conjunction with the 
senior executive reporting to the Minister (i.e. Deputy Minister). 
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In addition, this type of information allows business decisions to be made about how to 
address possible inefficiencies in policy or procedures. In particular, it allows an evaluation of 
the actual costs assumed to complete the mandate of the BCCS. With this level of micro-
analytic assessment, it is possible to look at the costs generated with an eye towards providing 
the same level of service at lesser cost. 
It is understood that government operates at the level of a bureau and that transaction costs 
are commensurately higher than those experienced in the private sector. The additional costs are 
usually driven by higher administrative ("bureaucratic") expenses that are generated with each 
transaction. Therefore, it can be less costly to export responsibility for certain tasks outside of 
the BCCS rather than attempting to provide the service internally. As an example, the BCCS 
contracts with private companies to meet the transport requirements of the work. This is an 
efficient approach as it utilizes the services of a contractor with fewer bureaucratic costs and 
therefore delivers the service in a more economic fashion. The cost to the BCCS for the 
negotiating, monitoring and enforcement of the contract is minimal and more than matched by 
the increased efficiencies. 
The ability to utilize an external contractor relies on several factors being met. First, if the 
level of service is the same, the level of bureaucratic cost must be lower with the contractor than 
with the government to make it worthwhile. Second, the outsourced service must not require a 
high level of administrative control for the transactions. Public bureaux, like the provincial 
government, are the most efficient form of governance when dealing with complex 
administrative requirements due to their high degree of regulatory controls. It would not be 
efficient to outsource a service for which the government provides the best governance structure. 
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As an example, contracting out strategic decision making for the BCCS would be counter-
productive in meeting the wishes of the public. 
Further, it would not be efficient to contract for services for which the BCCS has distinctive 
competencies. The BCCS ' distinctive competencies are around the investigation of deaths. This 
is a specialized area of investigation that requires a level of particular learning and knowledge 
that is best achieved through working within the BCCS. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
The British Columbia Coroners Service is a branch of government, within the Ministry of 
Public Safety and the Solicitor General, which is responsible to the people of British Columbia. 
The BCCS' mandate is to investigate deaths with an eye towards preventing future deaths in 
similar circumstances. Currently, the BCCS meets its legislated responsibilities as well as 
provides additional services that fit within its overall structure. As with all branches of 
government, there is an ongoing effort to ensure that the public receives as much value as 
possible from the limited resources available. 
This study has focused on the relationships between the public, politicians, and the public 
servants. These relationships were considered in the context of two questions that were proposed 
by this study. First, can corporate governance theories be applied to the provincial government 
in British Columbia? Second, if they are found to be applicable, is it possible to utilize these 
theories to create efficiencies within government. The British Columbia Coroners Service was 
used as the model within this study. 
In regards to the first posited question, the answer is that corporate governance theories can 
be applied to the context of government. Following a review of the relevant agency and 
transaction cost theories, and a review of the BCCS reporting structure within government, it is 
evident that there is a parallel between corporate governance structures and the provincial 
government. As per Figure 6, the public in the traditional government structure is a parallel for 
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the shareholder in corporate governance structures. As the principal in these structures, it is their 
wishes that are to be met by the public servant and worker respectively. 
This parallel between structures leads to the ability to utilize existing corporate governance 
theories in the context of the provincial government. Although, the government's bureaucratic 
composition adds supplementary transaction costs, discriminating alignment indicates that this 
form of governance structure is optimal for the complex interactions undertaken through 
government. 
The second question posed by this study asks whether it is possible to utilize corporate 
governance theories to create efficiencies within government. Following the review of the 
literature and the BCCS systems, it is evident that corporate governance theories can be used to 
advance existing government systems. 
As an example, it is possible to use these theories to improve the relationship between the 
public and the BCCS. In the review of agency theory, the literature indicated the need for an 
efficient contract to be developed between the principal and the agent. This contract requires 
that the potential for agent self-interest, as well as information asymmetry between the two 
parties be addressed. 
It is clear there is risk for the principal with the potential moral hazard of the agent. This risk 
may be removed if it is possible to align the self-interest of the agent with the goals of the 
principal. In some structures, this alignment can be achieved through the use of financial 
incentives to achieve the desired goals. However, the research indicates that this type of high 
incentive approach is difficult in a bureaucratic system like government. The more efficient 
approach within this context is through monitoring of the actions of the agent. 
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The BCCS database has the ability to generate information for mandated purposes; however, 
it is also capable of being utilized as a monitoring tool. As a monitoring system, it has the 
potential to provide senior management information which will inform it about the actions 
undertaken by the BCCS to ensure they are aligned with the wishes of the principal. This system 
would also address the issue of information asymmetry as an efficient database would ensure the 
relevant data would be available to those representing the public. 
The focus of this study has been on governance structures that ensure the public receives the 
highest level of service for their tax dollars. In particular, that there is symmetry between the 
wishes of the public and the actions of the BCCS. Further development of corporate governance 
structures would benefit this goal within government. 
Findings of this study suggest three recommendations for future development of the BCCS. 
First, further development of the BCCS database would improve the designated service while 
also addressing information asymmetry. By evolving the structure to include analytical 
processing, the database could become a full business intelligence system. Prior to taking this 
step, a requirement analysis should be completed which would specify those measures that are 
most useful to the senior management in their role overseeing BCCS services. Following this 
analysis, a reporting structure should be implemented with the level of granularity consistent 
with the strategic role of senior management. It is important that the information flowing for 
strategic decisions is sorted to provide only that which is useful to the end user. This information 
could then be used for better strategic planning as well as ensuring there is little 
misrepresentation in budgeting within the agency. 
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Second, it is evident that within the BCCS there are both legislated responsibilities and 
services that are provided without mandate. Given the strain on existing resources, it is 
important that the most efficient use of these resources is enacted. Consistent with agency 
theory, it is key for the public's wishes to dictate which services should be proffered by the 
BCCS. As the delegate of the public, political representatives and their senior managers in 
government need to order which services are required by the public. As it is evident that there 
might be different ways to meet a mandated task, this ranking should include the form the 
service should adopt so as to minimize potential agent self-interest. As an example, the direction 
to " identify trends" could signal the use of clerical staff to draw statistics, which would indicate 
any significant measures, from the BCCS database. Or, it could mean a team of individuals to 
provide a personal review of investigations and develop a report to outline trends. The form of 
the service can be as important as the service itself when developing and operating within 
budgetary constraints. 
Finally, an assessment of potential outsourcing opportunities needs to be undertaken. As 
previously stated, public bureaux like government are the optimal governance structure for 
complex and sensitive transactions. However, by their nature, bureaux also utilize low powered 
incentives and have additional costs attributable to the added bureaucratic encumbrances. 
Therefore, services that can be accessed outside of these additional bureaucratic costs should be 
pursued. 
Currently, the BCCS outsources services including transportation, pathology and toxicology. 
This allows the BCCS to capitalize on an economy of scale for these private services, while also 
benefiting from the lesser bureaucratic costs that these private companies experience. Although 
these three areas are important to the completion of the mandated responsibilities for the BCCS, 
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it is possible to have them outside the organization while retaining control of their actions. A 
review of all services within the BCCS should be undertaken to see which, if any, would be more 
efficiently contracted from outside the agency. 
In conclusion, previously there had been little study about the use of corporate governance 
strategies within a government bureau structure. By utilizing the model of the British Columbia 
Coroners Service, this study has illustrated the potential uses of corporate governance strategies 
within a provincial government structure. In particular, this study has shown means for 
government agencies to be accountable to the public that pays for their services. As government 
experiences limited resources, it is evident that the utilization of corporate governance strategies 
within a provincial structure is efficacious and ensures the needs of the public are met. 
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